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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Shammie L. Fisher ("Fisher" or "Insured") appeals from the district court's grant of 
summary judgment dismissing her suit against Garrison Property and Casualty Insurance 
Company ("Garrison" or "Insurer"). The district court granted summary judgment based on an 
exclusion from coverage for any loss caused by faulty, inadequate or defective work. 1 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Fisher did not include in her Appellant's Brief a Course of Proceedings section. GaiTison 
provides the following Course of Proceedings: 
Plaintiff Fisher filed her Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on May 27, 2015. (R., pp. 
5-10.) The Complaint was brought against USAA Casualty Insurance Company. (Id) An 
Answer to the Complaint was filed on July 10, 2015. (R., pp. 32-40.) The parties stipulated to 
allow Plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint and on July 21, 2015 the district court entered an 
Order Granting Motion to File Amended Complaint. (R., pp. 41-42.) An Amended Complaint 
was filed on July 27, 2015. (R., pp. 43-49.) Defendant USAA was substituted with Garrison. 
(Id.) The Amended Complaint alleged two causes of action: breach of contract and breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith of fair dealing. (Id.) On July 31, 2015, Garrison answered 
the Amended Complaint. (R., pp. 71-79.) 
1 Fisher also erroneously appeals from an alleged grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Garrison that there was no coverage for her loss and the district court's denial of cross motions 
for partial summary judgment relating to the intentional loss exclusion. Neither are proper issues 
on appeal. 
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On September 1, 2015, Fisher filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeking a 
ruling that the insurance policy provides coverage for her prope1iy damage losses. (R., pp. 80-
82.) In support of that Motion, Fisher filed an Affidavit (R., pp. 83-118), and a Memorandum 
(R.,p.119-129). 
Garrison filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on December 31, 2015 (R., pp. 
150-151) seeking a ruling that the property damage loss was excluded from coverage by the 
terms of two exclusions: intentional loss and faulty, inadequate or defective work. This Motion 
was supported by an Affidavit with attached exhibits (R., pp. 152-174), and a Memorandum (R., 
pp. 175-190). On January 15, 2016, Fisher filed her Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (R., pp. 191-202.) Garrison then filed, on January 25, 2016, a 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R., pp. 203-
206.) 
Following the hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment, held on February 1, 
2016, the district court requested additional briefing on the following issue: "Where General 
Exclusion l.h. is directly tied to activities of the insured, should the court consider it significant 
that General Exclusion 2.c. is not directly tied to activities of the insured?" (R., pp. 207-209.) 
Garrison filed its additional briefing on February 12, 2016. (R., pp. 210-214.) Fisher filed a 
Supplemental Memorandum on February 16, 2016. (R., pp. 215-222.) 
On February 25, 2016, the district court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: 
Cross Motions for Summary Judgment as to Coverage granting summary judgment that there 
was coverage for the loss, denying summary judgment on whether the intentional loss exclusion 
2 
applies and granting summary judgment that Fisher's loss was excluded from coverage by the 
faulty, inadequate or defective work exclusion. (R., pp. 223-238.) 
A Final Judgment was entered on March 25, 2016 dismissing Plaintiffs Amended 
Complaint with prejudice. (R., pp. 239-240.) 
Fisher timely filed her Notice of Appeal on April 13, 2016. (R., pp. 241-244.) Because 
the Notice of Appeal included the old caption naming USAA as the Defendant/Respondent, an 
Amended Notice of Appeal naming the correct Defendant/Respondent ("Garrison") was filed on 
May 4, 2016. (R., pp. 245-248.) 
C. Statement of Facts. 
The facts are not in dispute. The following Statement of Facts adds additional undisputed 
facts and places other undisputed facts in context. 
At all relevant times, Fisher was the owner of real property located at 2510 North 34th 
Street, Boise, Idaho. (R., p. 83, ,r 2.) GaiTison issued a dwelling policy to Fisher applying to that 
Described Location ("the Property"). (Id., p. 52.) 
Beginning in January 2012 Fisher (as seller) and Ron Reynoso ("Reynoso") (as buyer) 
negotiated a lease-to-purchase agreement for the Property. (R., p. 84, ,r 3.) The agreement is 
reflected in: (1) a Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement dated January 25, 2012 (R., pp. 88-
94); (2) a Counter Offer dated January 26, 2012 (R., p. 95.); (3) an Addendum dated January 28, 
2012 (R., p. 96); (4) an Addendum dated February 8, 2012 (R., p. 97); (5) an Addendum dated 
March 13, 2012 (R., p. 98); and (6) a Rental Agreement signed January 30, 2012 (R., pp. 105-
109) ( collectively referred to as "Lease-Purchase Agreement"). 
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The Lease-Purchase Agreement was for a one year term beginning on March 15, 2012 
and ending on March 31, 2013. (R., pp. 96; and 84, ,r 4.) In the event Reynoso was unable to 
close before January 31, 2013, Fisher agreed to a month-to-month option to extend the Lease-
Purchase Agreement until a buyer closed on the Property, ending no later than September I, 
2013. (R., p. 96.) Reynoso had the right to purchase the property during the term of the Lease-
Purchase Agreement for $153,000.00. (R., p. 95.) The Lease-Purchase Agreement expressly 
allowed Reynoso to make improvements to the Property with the intent to sell it for a profit. (R., 
p. 96.) 
The various documents making up the Lease-Purchase Agreement contain the following 
relevant provisions regarding Reynoso' s right to improve the Property: 
5. Should the Buyer use any Sub-Contractors while making improvements to 
this property, all disbursements are to be made by TitleOne and said Sub-
Contractors will be required to sign Lien-Waivers upon picking up their checks. 
(R., p. 95); 
8.) Any improvements to the property made by the Buyer during the lease 
period are forfeit to the Seller in the event the Buyer does not complete the 
purchase transaction. Seller is not responsible to reimburse Buyer any costs of 
improvements. 
9.) Buyer intends to make certain improvements to the property upon 
possession, with the intent to sell the property for a profit which might be prior to 
the end of the lease period. The buyer is required to give a monthly update for 
plans/upgrades. Buyer may market the property for resale prior to the end of the 
rental period with the intent to sell the property. 
(R., p. 96.) 
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6. OWNER'S AGREEMENT: 
b. MAJOR REPAIRS. Tenant shall be responsible for all major 
repairs to the premises 
c. MINOR REPAIRS. All repairs shall be paid by the tenant. 
Owner shall be notified by tenant of the repair prior to the work being 
done and repairs are to be accomplished in a workman like manner. 
(R., p. 105.) (Bold in original.) 
(9.) INSPECTION. Tenant agrees that Owner or Owner's authorized agent 
may enter the premises at reasonable times and intervals to inspect, repair, and 
maintain the same, or to show the property to any prospective buyer, or any loan 
or insurance agent. After notice of termination of this tenancy has been given by 
either party, Owner may show the premises to any prospective Tenant. 
(R., p. 107.) (Bold in original.) 
In response to Requests for Admission, Fisher admitted the following: 
1. As early as January 25, 2015, Fisher knew that Reynoso was going to 
make improvements to the Property. (R., p. 164.) 
2. Within the first two months after executing the contract for Lease-to-
Purchase Fisher knew that the dwelling had been leveled. (Id.) 
3. After learning that the dwelling had been leveled Fisher did not declare 
Reynoso to be in breach of any agreement and refrained from doing so 
because Reynoso promised to fix the damage he had caused and continue 
to make rent payments. (Id., pp. 164-165.) 
4. Fisher agreed to allow Reynoso time to fix the damage. (Id, p. 165.) 
5. Prior to submitting a Proof of Loss in September 2013, Fisher did not 
provide notice to Gan-ison that she considered the destruction of the 
dwelling to constitute a loss under the dwelling policy. (Id.) 
Reynoso promised Fisher that he would rebuild the dwelling. (R., p. 84, ,r 7.) As 
promised, Reynoso began rebuilding the dwelling. (R., pp. 113; 118.) Fisher monitored and was 
kept advised by Reynoso of the progress of the dwelling construction: 
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Jun B, 2012. 7:44 PM 
. ·:Bi ,·Ro;,.·. , rE{c'd ·a-letter 
:.ctQday f~om · lqw'\:rtor . :: 
:.>concrete.: It st_a,t~s a lien ·. / 
( o,itl1e proper~y -ifit )snot .·. 
\' paitiin 5 days. Tota! . ·::: <.': 
,· o.v~1ed ·is s1 .42f(94: .: · .. · 
.. . 1 . . • ~ • 
• ... ··_,_ ... ; : ; .·;-, 
Sorry it will be paid 
tomorrow had an issue 
with a lender being on time 
(R., pp.168-169.) 
Sop 7, 2012, 2:48 PM 
We start framing middle 
next week. Car accdt put 
me out of work 4 5 wks. 
Was going 2 put on the 
market oct 1 now mid 
nov maybe sooner 
(R., p. 170.) 
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(R., p. 171.) 
Mar 18, 2013, 5:13 PM 
,.:' G·o~;,ch~bk·tpd~y\ Tt:iank ':··.:, 
,:_,~l_" ·._·. ·._:'.' _:, ·:· -~ ---~-. __ ;:,_, . . :. · .,..-.' .>._/./ 
Cool. What r ur thoughts 
on the house ins thing? 
Awesome 
May 16, 2013, 6:13 PM 
t need the loan/ also 
very possible. I m still 
giving u 5k either way. 
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(R.,p. 173.) 
(R., 174.) 
(Id.) 
Was dropping 700in 
mlbx in morning. Other 
300 next Tues. Been 
back little over a wk. 
getting ready to frame 
2nd fir/already 
started.Plan on putting 
the 
roof on in 2 wks/around 
Mem day. Working w 
Jul 5, 2013, 9:25 PM 
Hoping late next wek. 
Yes on the meeting. Can 
my invstr realtr john 
hueger come 
U bet! Also I noticed 
tonight that some if ur 
walls r missing that u out 
up on the house. 
The archt drew two story 
walls for entry. I changed 
it thru city and cut them. 
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Fisher inspected the Property during construction. 
Jun 14, 2012. 9:19 PM 
(R., 169.) 
The one year lease term began on approximately March 31, 2013. (R., p. 84, i[4.) Within 
two months after the lease term began, Fisher was notified that "the entire home had been 
destroyed by Mr. Reynoso, including the structures and fixtures therein." (Id. at ,r 5.) 
In August 2013, Reynoso info1med Fisher that he was "walking away" from the house 
and did not intend to complete construction. (R., p. 84, ,r 7; Appellant's Brief, p. 2.) At the time 
construction ceased, the dwelling was incomplete and not habitable. (R., pp. 113; 118.) Fisher 
did not make a claim under the dwelling policy for loss until September 27, 2013, nearly one and 
one-half years after the dwelling was "destroyed". (R., p. 84, ,r 7.) 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The appellate rules contemplate that a Respondent set forth "additional" issues presented 
on appeal if the issues listed in Appellant's Brief are insufficient, incomplete or raise additional 
issues for review. I.A.R., Rule 3 5(b )( 4). The district court granted Fisher partial summary 
judgment that there was coverage under the policy. The district court denied Fisher's Motion for 
Summary Judgment that the intentional loss exclusion did not apply and GaiTison' s Cross-
9 
Motion for Summary Judgment that it did apply. Consequently, rather than three issues on 
appeal, there is only one: 
Did the district court properly grant Summary Judgment on the grounds that the 
exclusion for faulty, inadequate and/or defective work excluded the property 
damage loss? 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Standards of Review. 
1. Standard of Review for Grant of Summary Judgment. 
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the same as 
the district court's standard in ruling upon the motion. Thomson v. Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 
475-476, 50 P.3d 488, 490-491 (2002). This Court will review the record before the district 
court, including the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits, if any, to determine de 
nova whether, after construing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, 
there exists any genuine issues of material fact and whether the successful movant below is 
entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 40, 740 P.2d 
1022, 1026 (1987); I.R.C.P. 56(c). 
2. Standard of Review for Denial of Summary Judgment. 
It is well settled in Idaho that "[a]n order denying a motion for summary judgment is an 
interlocutory order from which no direct appeal may be taken." Dominguez, ex rel. Hamp v. 
Evergreen RES., Inc., 142 Idaho 7, 13, 121 P.3d 938, 944 (2005) (citation omitted). This rule is 
not altered by entry of an appealable final judgment. Id. 
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3. Standard of Review for Contract Interpretation. 
Where a contract is clear and unambiguous, the determination of the effect of a 
contractual provision is a question oflaw to be decided by the Court. Tolley v. THI Co., 140 
Idaho 253, 92 P.3d 503 (2004). The interpretation of the legal effect of a policy of insurance is a 
question of law over which this Court exercises de nova review. Howard v. Oregon Mutual Ins. 
Co., 137 Idaho 214, 46 P.3d 510 (2002). Interpreting contracts and applying the law to 
undisputed facts constitutes matters of law which this Court reviews de nova. Polk v. Larrabee, 
135 Idaho 303, 308, 17 P.3d 247,252 (2000). 
B. Analysis. 
1. Coverage is Not in Dispute Nor an Issue on Appeal. 
Fisher sets forth the following issue on appeal: 
1. Did the district court err when it determined that the insurance 
policy did not provide insurance coverage for Plaintiffs claimed losses to 
real and personal property, granting summary judgment in favor of 
Respondent? 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 3.) The district comi did not grant summary judgment in favor of Garrison 
that there was no coverage for the loss. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Fisher on that issue: 
There is no genuine issue of any material fact; the direct loss to the residence is a 
loss covered by the policy. The Court will grant partial summary judgment to 
Fisher as to this issue. 
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(R., p. 229.) It is unusual for an Appellant to seek reversal of a grant of partial summary 
judgment in his or her favor. This issue is not ( or should not be) an issue on appeal. The only 
issue on appeal is whether the property damage loss is excluded from coverage. 
2. The District Court's Denial of the Cross Motions for Summary Judgment 
Regarding the Application of the Intentional Loss Exclusion is Not 
Appealable. 
The district court denied the cross motions for summary judgment on whether the 
intentional loss exclusion applied to Fisher's loss. (R., p. 231.) Fisher appeals from that denial. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 4, 8, 11.) 
Fisher cannot appeal from the denial of the cross motions for summary judgment. 
Dominguez, 142 Idaho at 13, 121 P.3d at 944. Asking this Court to review and overturn the 
district court's denial of the cross motions for summary judgment should be rejected. 
3. The District Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment to Garrison that 
Fisher's Loss to the Dwelling was Excluded by the Faulty, Inadequate or 
Defective Work Exclusion. 
The district court held that the faulty, inadequate or defective work exclusion applies to 
Fisher's loss as follows: 
In this case, the Court has considered the language of the faulty, 
inadequate or defective work exclusion, and finds that the language is clear and 
unambiguous. There is an exclusion for any loss attributable to faulty, inadequate 
or defective work. The Court finds that the loss here was caused directly by 
faulty[,] inadequate or defective work as set fo1ih in the exclusion. The policy 
excludes coverage for any and all faulty, inadequate and/or defective work. 
Fisher has demonstrated that the direct loss was covered under the policy. 
Garrison has shown that the faulty, inadequate or defective work exclusion 
applies to Reynoso' s incomplete construction work. ... 
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(R., p. 236, 237.) The district court further held "that there is no genuine issue of material fact as 
to whether the faulty, inadequate or defective work exclusion applies; it does." (R., p. 237.) 
Fisher agrees there are no genuine issues of material fact relating to application of the faulty, 
inadequate or defective work exclusion. 
Rather, based upon the undisputed facts of record and based upon the language of 
the exclusion, the District Court should have found that the exclusion did not 
apply and should have granted summary judgment in favor of Appellant, not 
Respondent. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 12.) 
Nor does Fisher dispute the district court's finding that the language of the faulty, 
inadequate or defective work exclusion is clear and unambiguous. (R., p. 236.) Appellant 
appeals from the district comi opinion "and seeks an order from this Court that, based upon the 
uncontested facts and the plain language of the policy, there is no coverage for the losses and the 
exclusions do not apply." (Appellant's Brief, p. 1.) (See also Appellant's Brief, p. 5, "In this 
case, the clear language of the policy provides coverage for Appellant's loss".) 
Because there is agreement between and among the district court, Fisher and Garrison 
that the faulty, inadequate and defective work exclusion is clear and unambiguous and that the 
material facts are undisputed, this Comi, using the rules of construction described below, can 
determine whether the loss is excluded from coverage as a matter of law. 
An insurance policy will generally be construed so that the insurer bears the burden of 
proving that the asse1ied exclusion is applicable. Harman v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 
91 Idaho 719, 721, 429 P .2d 849, 851 (1967). "The language of standardized contracts must 
13 
necessarily be somewhat general, in anticipation of varying circumstances and facts." Foster v. 
Johnstone, 107 Idaho 61, 65, 685 P.2d 802, 806 (1984). "There is no obligation on courts to 
countenance a tortured construction of an insurance contract's language in order to create an 
ambiguity and thus provide an avenue for coverage where none exists." Mutual of Enumclaw 
Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 128 Idaho 232,236,912 P.2d 119, 123 (1996). "A contract must be 
interpreted according to the plain meaning of the words used if the language is clear and 
unambiguous." Hill v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 150 Idaho 619,622,249 P.3d 812,815 
(2011). 
Where policy language is found to be unambiguous, this Court is to construe the policy as 
written, "and the Court by construction cannot create a liability not assumed by the insurer nor 
make a new contract for the parties, or one different from that plainly intended, nor add words to 
the contract of insurance to either create or avoid liability." Armstrong v. Farmers Ins. Co. of 
Idaho, 147 Idaho 67, 69,205 P.3d 1203, 1205 (2009) (quoting Purvis v. Progressive Casualty 
Ins. Co., 142 Idaho 213,216, 127 P.3d 116, 119 (2005)). Common, non-technical words are 
given the meaning applied by laymen in daily usage in order to effect the intent of the parties. 
Armstrong, 147 Idaho at 69,205 P.3d at 205. 
The de nova review by this Court is thereby limited to applying the clear and 
unambiguous language of the faulty, inadequate or defective work exclusion to the undisputed 
facts to determine whether Fisher's loss is excluded from coverage. 
14 
a. Fisher's Loss is Excluded by the Plain Meaning of the Faulty, Inadequate 
or Defective Work Exclusion. 
Fisher's policy provides coverage for her dwelling. (R ., p. 60.) ThP pPril im:nrPrl ~g~in<:t 
is the risk of direct loss to her dwelling if that loss is a physical loss to the property. (Id. at p. 
63.) (Appendix A.) A "loss" is generally defined as: 
3. Insurance. The amount of financial detriment caused by ... an insured 
property's damage, for which the insurer becomes liable. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 8th Ed., p. 963. There is no dispute that Fisher suffered a direct, 
physical loss to her property - an incomplete, uninhabitable house. 
The policy excludes from coverage any loss to prope1iy caused by any of the following: 
c. Faulty, inadequate or defective; 
(2) design, specifications, workmanship, repair, construction, renovation, 
remodeling, grading, compaction; 
of part or all of any property whether on or off the Described Location. 
(R., p. 66.) (Appendix A.) The loss here resulted from faulty, inadequate or defective 
workmanship, repair, construction, renovation and/or remodeling of the dwelling, leaving it, to 
her financial detriment, in an incomplete state. 
The relevant terms in the faulty, inadequate and defective work exclusion have the 
following common, non-technical definitions used by laymen in daily use: 
I. Inadequate not adequate; insufficient 
2. Defective - having a defect; faulty 
3. Faulty- containing a fault or faults; imperfect 
a. Workmanship the quality of such art, skill or technique 
b. Repair - to restore to sound condition after damage or injury; fix; 
the work, act or process of repairing 
15 
c. Construction - the act or process of constructing; the state of being 
constructed; the way in which something is put together 
d. Renovation to make new; to restore to a previous condition, as 
by remodeling 
e. Remodeling - to remake with a new structure 
WEBSTER II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY, 558,295,409, 1272, 939,242 and 937 (1999). 
The undisputed facts show that the buyer/lessee Reynoso was to make certain 
improvements to the dwelling. By definition, improvements involve workmanship, construction, 
renovation and/or remodeling. Those improvements were not completed and were therefore 
inadequate, defective or faulty. Any loss based on "certain improvements" to the dwelling is 
excluded by the plain language of the exclusion. 
In the process of improving the property for resale (the Lease-Purchase Agreement does 
not limit the improvements), Reynoso tore down, or as Fisher labels it "destroyed" the dwelling. 
By definition, this also involves construction ( demolition is a process of construction), 
renovation ( demolition is a process related to renovating existing structures), and remodeling 
( demolition is part and parcel of remodeling). After the demolition/destruction of substantial 
portions of the dwelling it was inadequate (not adequate for or unequal to the purpose of being a 
dwelling) and defective (wanting in something, incomplete, lacking a paii, deficient) and faulty 
(not fit for the use intended). Any loss based on "destroying" the dwelling is excluded by the 
plain language of the exclusion. 
Reynoso began rebuilding the dwelling in order to, as Fisher states, "repair" the damage 
to the dwelling. Moreover, the undisputed facts show that Reynoso intended to improve the 
dwelling for resale and profit. By definition and admission, rebuilding the dwelling involves 
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workmanship, repair and construction. Reynoso did not complete the construction of the 
dwelling or complete the repair of the damage, making that workmanship, repair and 
construction inadequate, defective and faulty. Any loss based on failing to rebuild or repair the 
dwelling is excluded by the plain language of the exclusion. 
Regardless of the words used by Fisher to describe the causes of the loss, applying any of 
those causes to the plain meaning of the exclusion supports the application of that exclusion to 
Fisher's loss. The failure to complete the improvements, the demolition of the dwelling, the 
repair of the damage and construction of those repairs and the failure to complete the 
improvements or rebuild the dwelling were losses caused by faulty, inadequate or defective 
workmanship, repair, construction, renovation and/or remodeling of pmi or all of the dwelling. 
The district court correctly ruled that the plain meaning of the exclusion applied to and 
excluded Fisher's loss. The district court should be affirmed. 
b. The Words, Terms, and Conditions Fisher Seeks to Add to the Exclusion 
Cannot Preclude Application of the Exclusion. 
Fisher argues that the faulty, inadequate, or defective work exclusion does not apply 
because she did not authorize Reynoso to destroy the dwelling, the destruction was not done at 
her direction or done by her, she had no knowledge that Reynoso had "leveled" the dwelling, and 
she did not hire or have a contractual undertaking with her tenant to do the work or to repair the 
damage. Each of these arguments is made to avoid the application of the exclusion and requires 
adding words, terms, or conditions to the exclusion and ignore the plain meaning of the words 
actually used in the exclusion. 
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When analyzing the clear and unambiguous language of the faulty, inadequate, or 
defective work exclusion, this Court is constrained to construe it as written. See Armstrong, 147 
at 69, 205 P.3d at 1205. This Court cannot add words to the contract of insurance to either create 
or avoid liability. Id. The faulty, inadequate or defective work exclusion has no language that 
Fisher authorize, direct, have knowledge of, perform herself, or hire out to a third person. To 
engraft these words, terms, and conditions onto the clear and unambiguous language violates 
long-established rules of contract construction. It fails to construe the policy as written. Adding 
words, terms and conditions creates a liability not assumed by Garrison. Fisher's request to add 
these words, terms or conditions should be rejected. 
Support for not adding Fisher's words, terms, or conditions to the faulty, inadequate, or 
defective work exclusion is found in the presence of similar words and conditions in a different 
exclusion (intentional loss) and the absence of those terms and conditions in the subject 
exclusion (faulty, inadequate or defective work exclusion). The intentional loss exclusion in 
Fisher's policy provides: 
h. Intentional Loss, meaning any loss arising out of any act 
committed: 
(1) by or at the direction of you or any person or 
organization named as an additional insured; and 
(2) with the intent to cause a loss. 
(R., p. 66.) (Appendix A.) There is no "by or at the direction of' the insured language in the 
faulty, inadequate, or defective work exclusion. Id. 
As the district court held: 
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The conclusion that the faulty, inadequate or defective work exclusion 
provision is unambiguous is further supported by reviewing the language of the 
intentional loss provision. In that exclusion, whether an intentional loss was 
excluded depended expressly upon \Vhether the loss arose out of an act committed 
"by or at the direction of the [insured]". The faulty, inadequate or defective work 
exclusion provision makes no mention of whether the work activity was done by 
or at the direction of the insured~ The presence of this language in one exclusion 
and the absence of this language in another exclusion is telling. The absence of 
this language supports the conclusion that the policy did not intend to condition 
the faulty, inadequate or defective work exclusion on whether any work was 
undertaken by or on behalf of the insured. 
(R., pp. 236-237.) The expression or inclusion of one thing implies the exclusion of another. 
See Ace Realty Inc. v. Anderson, 106 Idaho 742,749,682 P.2d 1289, 1296 (Ct. App. 1984). If 
Garrison had intended the faulty, inadequate or defective work exclusion to require that it apply 
only when the loss/work was done "by or at the direction of' the insured, it could have borrowed 
that language from the intentional loss exclusion. Garrison's failure to do so leads to a 
reasonable inference that it did not intend to limit the faulty, inadequate or defective work 
exclusion be limited to a loss arising out of work "by or at the direction" the insured. The 
absence of that language in the faulty, inadequate or defective work exclusion is indeed telling. 
The clear and unambiguous language of the subject exclusion precludes adding Fisher's 
words, terms, or conditions in order to avoid its application. The district court correctly refused 
to add any words, te1ms or conditions to the exclusion. The district court should be affomed. 
c. Even if the Exclusion is Deemed Ambiguous and Interpreted to Include 
Additional Words, Terms, or Conditions, the Exclusion Still Applies. 
19 
Even if the Court adds Fisher's words, te1ms or conditions to the faulty, inadequate, or 
defective work exclusion, the undisputed facts show that even with the added language, the 
exclusion applies. 
(1) Fisher Authorized Work to be Done to the Dwelling. 
The Lease-Purchase Agreement expressly and in writing authorized improvements and 
repairs to the dwelling. (R., pp. 95-96, 105.) Fisher signed the Lease-Purchase Agreement. 
Fisher admitted that she verbally authorized the tenant to fix the damage and rebuild the 
dwelling. (R., pp. 164-165.) Even if"authorized" is added to the exclusion, that condition to the 
application of the exclusion was met. 
Fisher argues that she did not, however, authorize the destruction of the entire dwelling. 
This merely expresses her dissatisfaction with the outcome of the authorized work. The fact that 
the improvements led to damage she did not authorize simply defines the scope of the loss 
(damages) rather than its cause.2 Fisher authorized work to be done on the dwelling. That 
authorized work involved workmanship, construction, repair, renovation, or remodeling. That 
authorized work was faulty, inadequate, or defective. The exclusion applies even if authorization 
is required. 
2 For instance, under Fisher's interpretation of this added term, if Reynoso had, in the process of 
doing the certain improvements she authorized damaged a load bearing wall causing the 
dwelling to collapse, the exclusion would not apply because she did not authorize him to damage 
the wall or cause the house to collapse. This is not a reasonable interpretation of the scope of the 
exclusion, even if authorization is required. 
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Regardless, it is undisputed that she authorized the tenant to "fix the damage" and 
"rebuild" the dwelling. (R., pp. 164-165.) The failure to do so caused Fisher's ultimate loss - a 
partially constructed dwelling. An unfinished, incomplete dwelling is faulty, inadequate or 
defective construction or repair. To the extent authorization is required, the exclusion applies to 
her loss. 
(2) The Work Was Done by or at the Direction of Fisher. 
Fisher argues the exclusion only applies to work done by or at her direction. Similar to 
authorizing Reynoso to do work, the work was done by or at Fisher's direction. 
Fisher directed Reynoso' s use of subcontractors used in making the authorized 
improvements to the dwelling by requiring all disbursements be made by TitleOne and that the 
subcontractors sign lien-waivers. (R., p. 95.) Fisher directed Reynoso's work by requiring him 
to give a monthly update for "plans/upgrades." (R., p. 96.) Fisher had the right to inspect the 
premises. (R., p. 107.) Indeed, she monitored the reconstruction of the dwelling and questioned 
the possible lien for concrete, a stop work order sign on the dwelling (''just checking to make 
sure all is good"), and monitoring progress of the reconstruction. (R., pp. 168, 169, 170, 173.) 
To the extent "by or at the direction" of Fisher is added to the exclusion, that condition was met. 
(3) Fisher had Knowledge that Work Would Be Done. 
Fisher claims that she did not have knowledge that Reynoso would destroy the dwelling. 
She has admitted, however, that she knew improvements would be done to the dwelling. (R., p. 
164.) The fact that she did not know the final outcome of the work is of no consequence to the 
application of the exclusion. At most, if knowledge is required, it would be knowledge of some 
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repair, construction, renovation or remodeling to the dwelling, not knowledge that this work 
would be done in a faulty, inadequate, or defective manner. 
Regardless, she had full knowledge of the repair and construction of the dwelling (and, in 
fact, monitored its progress). She also had full knowledge that the repair or construction was not 
completed. To the extent knowledge of the work done is required, she had it. 
(4) Fisher Had an Agreement With the Tenant to Do Work on the 
Dwelling. 
Fisher argues that she did not, however, hire Reynoso to demolish the dwelling or to 
rebuild it. Fisher had a written agreement with the tenant to do improvements and major repairs 
to the dwelling. (R., pp. 96, 105.) Fisher had an oral agreement with the tenant to repair the 
damage and construct the dwelling. (R., p. 164.) Although the written agreement and oral 
contract may not be traditional construction contracts, the work to be done under those 
agreements (improvements, repairs, and rebuilding the house) provided consideration to both 
parties. If Reynoso failed to close on the property before the Lease-Purchase Agreement 
expired, all improvements forfeited to Fisher. (R., p. 96.) Improvements or repairs would 
maintain or increase the value of Fisher's security (the dwelling). On the other hand, Reynoso's 
work was done with the intent to sell the property for a profit. (R., p. 96.) If an agreement to do 
the work is required, that condition was met. 
Even if the faulty, inadequate, or defective work exclusion is interpreted to require that 
Fisher authorize or direct the work, have knowledge that the work was being done, or have an 
agreement or contractual undertaking to do the work, these conditions were met. She authorized, 
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directed, had knowledge of, and had agreements to improve the property, make repairs to it, and 
rebuild it. That she claims she did not authorize, direct, have knowledge of, or contractually 
agree to destroy or leave the property unbuilt is irrelevant. The loss to the property, whether 
labeled as its destruction or its lack of completion, merely defines the scope of the damage 
caused by faulty, inadequate, or defective workmanship, repair, construction, renovation or 
remodeling. Fisher's loss is excluded even under the expanded version of the exclusion. 
d. Case Law Relied on by Fisher Fails to Support the Non-Application of the 
Faulty, Inadequate or Defective Work Exclusion; Other Case Law 
Supports Application of the Exclusion. 
Fisher relies on case law from foreign jurisdictions to support non-application to her loss 
of the faulty, inadequate or defective work exclusion. Given the plain and unambiguous 
language of the exclusion and the undisputed facts, there is no reason to resort to any case law to 
dete1mine whether this exclusion applies to Fisher's loss. Applying the undisputed facts to the 
plain meaning of the exclusion should end the analysis. 
Nevertheless, the foreign jurisdiction case law does not support her arguments because: 
(1) they are distinguishable on their facts; (2) they add words, terms or conditions to the 
exclusion in contravention of contract construction rules; or (3) they support application of the 
exclusion. 
Fisher argues that the foreign jurisdiction case law upon which she relies stands for the 
proposition that the plain meaning of the exclusion nmTows its application to losses where the 
insured authorizes the work, does the work, or hires someone to do the work. (Appellant's Brief, 
p. 17.) 
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The centerpiece of Fisher's foreign jurisdiction case law analysis is Husband v. 
LaFayette Ins. Co., 635 So. 2d 309 (La. 1994). In Husband, the Louisiana Court interpreted the 
exclusion to apply to a situation where the insured, or someone authorized by the insured, 
contracted to do the alterations to the property. Husband, 635 So. 2d at 311. Because in that 
case the alterations were undertaken without authorization and in direct conflict with the te1ms of 
the lease, the exclusion was found not to apply. Based on Husband, Fisher argues, the exclusion 
here does not apply because the "destrnction" of the dwelling by Reynoso was not done at her 
direction or with her authorization or pursuant to a contract. 
The holding in Husband does not support non-application of the exclusion to Fisher's 
loss .. First, Fisher had a written and oral agreement with Reynoso to make alterations to the 
property. (R., pp. 96, 164-165.) These improvements to, and repair and rebuilding of, the 
dwelling were authorized by Fisher. This authorization and contracted for work was done in a 
faulty, inadequate or defective manner. Even under Husband, the exclusion applies. 
Second, the Louisiana Court interpreted the exclusion to add words, terms and conditions 
not found in its plain and unambiguous language. As discussed above, the exclusion does not 
contain language that the work be undertaken by the insured or someone authorized by the 
insured to do that work. Under Idaho rules of contract construction, there is no need to construe 
the plain and unambiguous language of the exclusion and it violates rules of construction to add 
terms and conditions to the exclusion, especially when similar terms and exclusions exist in a 
different exclusion but not in the subject exclusion. 
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Third, Husband is factually distinguishable. In Husband, the insured had no knowledge 
that any work was being done and made a claim only when the loss was discovered. Here, 
Fisher knew some work (improvements) was happening. She had the right to inspect that work 
and get periodic reports of its status. Moreover, Fisher knew about the repair and rebuild of the 
dwelling before it happened. She monitored that work as it happened. She did not make a claim 
upon "discovery" of the destruction of the dwelling. Indeed, she did not make a claim until after 
the actual loss occurred - the incomplete repair and rebuild (for which she had complete 
knowledge). 
Fisher also relies on Home Savings of America, FS.B. v. Continental Ins. Co., 87 Cal. 
App. 4th 835 (Ct. App. 2001). In Home Savings, the Court determined that the faulty, 
inadequate or defective work exclusion did not exclude the loss caused by a third party's 
intentional destruction of a residence. Home Savings, 87 Cal. App. 4th at 852. Fisher argues that 
similarly, in this case, the loss caused by Reynoso's intentional destruction of the dwelling was 
not excluded. (Appellant's Brief, p. 14.) 
Home Savings, however, is distinguishable. In Home Savings there was a total 
destruction of the residence. The residence was destroyed for the sole purpose of redevelopment 
without any intent to rebuild it. Here, there was no total destruction of the residence. (R., p. 
118.) Here, the work was done to sell the property for a profit. (R., p. 96.) Here, there was a 
clear intent to rebuild the dwelling, which process was in fact started. (R., p. 118.) In Home 
Savings, the damages arose from the total destruction of the dwelling. Here, the damages arose 
from an incomplete dwelling. 
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Fisher also relies on Fidelity Co-Op Bank v. Nova Casualty Co., 726 F .3d 31 (1st Cir. 
2013), because it relies on the language from Husband that a faulty workmanship exclusion was 
"intended to prevent the expansion of coverage under the policy to ensuring the quality of the 
contractual undertaking by the insured or someone authorized by him." Fidelity Co-Op Bank, 
726 F.3d at 38. Fidelity Co-Op is distinguishable on its facts. In that case, the undisputed 
evidence showed that the faulty workmanship (a roofrepair) occurred prior to the insured's 
ownership. Here, the work was done during Fisher's ownership. Moreover, Fisher claims that 
Fidelity Co-Op stands for the proposition that "[b ]ecause the work on the roof was not a 
contractual undertaking by the insured or someone authorized by the insured, the exclusion did 
not apply." (Appellant's Brief, p. 15.) However, the Fidelity Co-Op Court's reference to the 
Husband language does not stand for the proposition that there must be a contractual undertaking 
or authorization for the work that was faulty. Fidelity Co-Op was merely agreeing that the 
exclusion was not intended to expand coverage to ensure the quality of construction.3 
Fisher argues that based on Husband, Home Savings, Fidelity Co-Op and 11 Essex, the 
plain meaning of the exclusion applies only to situations where the insured, or someone 
authorized by the insured, contracts for alterations to the property and is dissatisfied with the 
quality or performance under the contract. (Appellant's Brief, p. 17.) That is the situation here. 
Fisher authorized Reynoso in the written Lease-Purchase Agreement and the oral agreement to 
3 Fisher also relies upon 11 Essex St. Corp. v. Tower Ins. Co. a/New York, 2005 N.Y. Misc. 
LEXIS 3556, 234 N.Y.L.J. 115 (S.C. New York 2005) because it quotes Husband. (Appellant's 
Brief, p. 16.) This appears to be a trial court decision with no precedential or persuasive value. 
Nor does this case add anything new to the discourse. 
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make alterations to the property and was clearly dissatisfied with the quality of his performance. 
These cases support application of the exclusion or are otherwise distinguishable. 
Other cases have held that the exclusion applies regardless of the insured's authorization 
of the work, involvement in the work done or knowledge that the work had occurred. These 
cases also held that the language of the faulty, inadequate or defective work exclusion is clear 
and unambiguous, thereby precluding an interpretation of the exclusion that adds words, terms or 
conditions. 
In Wilson v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 102 Cal.App.4th 1171 (Ct. App. 2002), the insured 
submitted a claim for the loss in the value of their house resulting from an unfinished renovation 
project. Id at 1172. The Wilson Court upheld summary judgment that the loss was expressly 
excluded from coverage as a loss caused by inadequate repair, construction, renovation, or 
remodeling. Id The Court held "[a]n unfinished renovation or remodeling project that leaves 
the house in disrepair is plainly 'inadequate."' Id at 1174. 
The Wilson Court distinguished Home Savings for two reasons. First, the Wilson Court 
determined that the exclusion was not limited to loss caused by "faulty construction" but "applies 
more broadly to any loss caused by faulty, inadequate, or defective workmanship, repair, 
construction, renovation, or remodeling." Id at 1175. 
Second, the Wilson Court distinguished Home Savings based on factual distinctions 
specifically the insured home in Home Savings was not simply renovated or remodeled, it was 
completely destroyed and was destroyed by a third pmiy entirely without the mortgagee bank's 
knowledge. Id at 1175. 
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Here [in Wilson], on the other hand, plaintiffs reasonably should have known a 
renovation project undertaken by or on behalf of the named insured with their 
knowledge, which involved some demolition but not the complete destruction of 
the house, gave rise to a risk that ivas excluded from coverage under the 
"inadequate renovation" exclusion. The risk was that the renovation or 
remodeling would be performed defectively or inadequately, leaving the house in 
a state of disrepair that reduced its value. This is exactly the sort of risk of loss 
expressly encompassed by the "inadequate renovation" exclusion, and exactly the 
sort of loss plaintiffs suffered when Wampler abandoned his renovation of the 
house before it was completed. 
Id. at 1176. 
Like Wilson, Fisher should have reasonably known that the improvement project 
undertaken with her knowledge, which necessarily involved some demolition,4 might give rise to 
a risk excluded by the faulty, inadequate or defective work exclusion. The risk was that 
Reynoso's improvements would be performed defectively or inadequately leaving the dwelling 
in a state of disrepair ( even total disrepair) that reduced its value. 
Like Wilson, Fisher should also have reasonably known that repairing the damage and 
rebuilding the dwelling might give rise to a risk excluded by the faulty, inadequate or defective 
work exclusion. The risk here was that Reynoso's repair and rebuild would be performed 
inadequately or defectively leaving the dwelling in a state of disrepair that reduced the value of 
the dwelling. This is exactly the sort of risk of loss encompassed by the faulty, inadequate or 
defective work exclusion and exactly the loss suffered when Reynoso abandoned the repair and 
rebuild before the dwelling was completed. 
4 Even "cosmetic" improvements involving flooring and countertops require demolition of the 
old flooring and counte1iops. 
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The Wilson Court ultimately determined that the loss fell within the scope of the faulty, 
inadequate or defective work exclusion, as a matter of law, because: 
Where, as here, the named insured or someone authorized by the named insured 
engages in renovation or remodeling with the knowledge and approval of the 
mortgagee, the "inadequate renovation" exclusion precludes the mortgagee who is 
later dissatisfied with the quality of the insured's performance of the renovation 
from claiming coverage because the renovation has left the property worth less 
than it was before. 
Id. at 1177. 
Like Wilson, Fisher authorized Reynoso to engage in renovation or remodeling 
(improvements) with her knowledge and approval. She was later dissatisfied with the quality of 
Reynoso's perfo1mance of the improvements (renovation and remodeling). As in Wilson, the 
exclusion applies because the improvements left the property worth less than it was before. 
Like Wilson, Fisher authorized Reynoso to engage in repair and construction of the 
dwelling with her knowledge and approval. That repair and construction was begun but was not 
completed. Fisher was dissatisfied with the quality of Reynoso' s performance of the repair and 
construction. As in Wilson, the exclusion applies to the incomplete repair and construction 
because the property was worth less than it was before. 
In Stephens v. Liberty Mutual, 2008 WL 480287 (N.D.Cal. 2008), the federal district 
court, in an umepo1ied case, determined that the faulty, inadequate or defective work exclusion 
is not ambiguous. Id. at * 14. The Stephens Court also held, the application of the exclusion does 
not depend on whether the insured or any third party authorized the construction or hired the 
contractor. Id. at * 15. 
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In Stephens, the Court further noted that the insured "never agreed or contracted to have 
its building struck with heavy machinery, used for storage of construction material, or damaged 
as a result of the negligent activity of the Olympic Club or Plant Construction." Id. The 
Stephens Court rejected that argument and applied the exclusion. Similarly, Fisher argues the 
exclusion does not apply here because she never agreed or contracted to have Reynoso "destroy" 
the dwelling. This argument should also be rejected. 
In analyzing a similar faulty, inadequate or defective work exclusion the Court in 
Capelouto v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 990 P.2d 414 (Wash.App. 1999), noted "[a]n insured may 
not avoid a contractual exclusion merely by affixing an additional label or separate 
characterization to the act or event causing the loss." Capelouto, 990 P.2d at 418. Rather, courts 
must tum to general principles governing the interpretation of the insurance contracts, including 
examining the ordinary meaning of the terms used. Id. Here, Fisher attempts to avoid the 
exclusion by labeling or characterizing the act or event causing the loss as destroying the 
property. The Capelouto Court suggests that these gratuitous labels or characterizations be 
ignored in favor of more accurate words to describe the act or event causing the loss - here, 
remodeling, renovating, repair and construction. Ultimately, the Capelouto Court determined 
that the "plain meaning of the exclusion indicates that the claimed loss, damage caused by a 
contractor's use of an inadequate pump on a sewer replacement project off the insured's 
premises, is not covered." Id. at 418. 
Case law from foreign jurisdictions analyzing or interpreting similar exclusions need not 
be consulted. The language of the faulty, inadequate or defective work exclusion is clear and 
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unambiguous and the undisputed facts must be applied to the plain meaning of that language. 
That language does not include words, terms or conditions requiring Fisher to authorize or direct 
the alterations to the property, contract with a third party to do the alterations or have knowledge 
of exactly what work is going to be done before it is performed. Even if foreign case law is 
consulted, those cases that are more factually analogous to the present case and do not construe 
or interpret the exclusion to include words, terms or conditions not expressly stated therein 
support application of the faulty, inadequate and defective work exclusion to Fisher's loss. 
IV. CONCLUSION. 
Garrison respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's grant of summary 
judgment and dismissal of Fisher's Complaint on the grounds that her loss is excluded from 
coverage by the faulty, inadequate or defective work exclusion. 
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d. weight of contents, equipment. animals 
or people; 
e. weight of rain which collects on a roof; 
f. use of defective material or methods in 
construction, remodeling or renovation 
if the collapse occurs during the course 
of the construction, remodeling or 
renovation. 
Loss to ail awning, fence, patio, pavement. 
swimming pool, underground pipe, flue, 
drain, cesspool, septic tank, foundation, 
retaining wall, bulkhead, pier, wharf or dock 
is not lnclcded under items b, c, d, e and f 
unless the loss Is a direct result of the 
collapse of a bullding. 
Collapse does not include settling, cracking, 
shrinking, bulging or expansion. 
· This coverage does not Increase the limit of 
liability applying to the damaged covered 
property. 
r 
11. Glass or Safety Glazing Material. We 
cover: 
a. the breakage of glass or safety glazing 
material which is part of a covered 
building, storm door or storm window; 
and 
b. damage to covered property by glass or 
safety grazing material which is pan of a 
building, storm door or storm window. 
This coverage does not Include loss on the 
Described location If the dwentng has been 
vacant for more than 30 consecutive days 
immediately before the loss. A dwelling 
being constructed ls not considered vacant 
Loss for damage to glass will be settled on 
the basis of replacement with safety glazing 
materials when required by ordinance or 
law. 
This coverage does not increase the limit of 
liabnity that applies to the damaged 
property. 
PERILS INSURED AGAINST 
COVERAGE A - DWELLING and 
COVERAGE B - OTHER STRUCTURES 
1Wi Jntt,Jfe - zig~rrisc1tsi<. ·,1:ii: di~t· loss - to 
property cfescrlbed ·rn ·coverages ·A and B only 
If tlia~ .. loss rs a ·pliysfcal loss fo property; 
however. We do not Insure loss: 
: - ..... - ... .. . 
1. involving collapse, other than as provided In 
Other Coverages 1 O: 
2, caused by. 
a. freezing of a plumbing, heating, air 
conditioning or automatic fire protective 
sprinkler system or of a household 
appliance, or by discharge, leakage or 
overflow from within the system or 
appliance caused by freezing. This 
exclusion applies only while the dwelling 
Is vacant, unoccupied or being 
constructed unless you have used 
reasonable care to: 
.(1} maintain heat In the building: or 
(2} shut off the water supply and drain 
the system and appliances of water; 
b. freezing, thawing, pressure or weight of 
water or Ice. whether driven by wind or 
not, to a: 
(1) fence, pavement, patio or swimming 
pool: 
(2) foundation, retaining wa!I or 
bulkhead; or 
(3) pier, wharf or dock; 
c. theft of property not part of. a covered 
building or structure; · 
d. theft In or to a dwelling or structure 
under construction: 
e. wind, hail, Ice. snow or sleet to: 
(1} outdoor radio and television 
antennas and aerials including their 
lead-In wiring. masts or towers: or 
(2) trees, shrubs, plants or lawns; 
f. vandalism and malicious mischief, theft 
or attempted theft .If the awelling has 
been ·vacant for more than 30 
ci:insec~ve cf~ys immediately before the 
loss. A dwelling being constructed is not 
considered vacant; 
g. constant or repeated seepage or 
leakage or water or steam over a period 
of weeks, months or years from within 
a plumbing, heating. air conditioning or 
automatic fire protective sprinkler 
system or from within a household 
appliance; 
h. (1) wear and tear, marring, deterioration, 
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inherent vice, latent defect, 
mechanical breakdown; 
smog, rust or other corrosion, mold, 
wet or dry rot; 
smoke From agricultural smudging or 
Industrial operations; 
discharge, dispersal, seepage. 
migration release or escape of 
pollutants. 
Pollutants means any solld, liquid, 
gaseous or thermal irritant or 
contaminant, including smoke, vapor, 
soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals 
and waste. Waste includ~s • materials 
to be recycled. reconditioned or 
reclaimed; 
(6) settling. ·shrinking. bulging or expan-
sion. including resultant cracking. of 
pavements, patios, foundations. 
walls, floors. roofs or ceilings; or 
(7) birds. vermin. rodents, insects or 
domestic animals. 
If any of these cause •..vater damage not 
otherwise excluded, from a plumbing, 
heating, air conditioning or automatic 
fire protective sprinkler system or 
household appliance, we cover loss 
caused by L"le water including the cost 
of tearing out and replacing any part of 
a building necessary to repc!ir the 
system or appliance. We do not cover 
Joss to the system or appliance from 
which this water escaped. 
3. excluded under General Exclusions. 
Under items 1 and 2, any ensuing loss to 
property described in Coverages A and B not 
excluded or excepted in this polfcy is covered. 
. COVERAGE C - PERSONAL PROPERTY 
We Insure for direct physical loss to the 
property described In Coverage C caused by a 
peril listed below unless the loss is excluded in 
the General Exclusions. 
1. Fire or lightning. 
2. Windstorm or hall. 
This peril does not include loss to 
a. property contained in a build ng caused 
by rain. snow, sleet. sand or dust unless 
the direct force of wind or hail damages 
the bulld,ng causing an opening in a roof 
or wall and the rain. snow, sleet, sand or 
dust enters through this opening: 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
b. canoes and rowboats; or 
c. trees, shrubs or plants. 
Explosion. 
Riot or civil commotion. 
Aircraft, lncludfng self-propelled missiles 
and spacecraft. 
Vehicles. 
Smoke, meaning sudden and accidental 
damage from smoke. 
This peril does not Include Joss caused by 
smoke from agricultural smudging or 
Industrial operations. 
8. Vandalism or malicious mischief. 
This peril does not Include loss by pilferage, 
theft. burglary or larceny. 
9. Damage by Burglars, meaning damage to 
covered property caused by Burglars. 
This peril does not Include; 
a theft of property; or 
b. damage caused by burglars to property 
on the Described Location if the 
dwelllng has been vaca·nt For more than 
30 consecutive days Immediately before 
the damage occurs. A dwelling being 
constructed is not considered vacant. 
10. Falling Objects. 
This peril does not include loss to property 
contained In the bulld[ng unless the roof or 
an outside wall of the buifdlng is first 
damaged by a falling object 
Damage to the falling oftiect itself Is not 
covered. 
11. Weight of ice, snow or sleet which causes 
damage to property contained in the 
building . 
12. Accidental discharge or overflow of 
water or steam from within a plumbing, 
heating. air conditioning or automatic fire 
protective sprinkler system or From within a 
household appliance. 
This peril does not lndude loss: 
a. to the system or appliance from which 
the water or steam escaped; 
b caused by or resulting from freezing 
except as provided In the peril of 
freezing below: or 
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c. on the Described Location caused by 
accidental discharge or overflow which 
occurs off the Described location. 
In this peril, a plumbing system does not 
include a sump, sump pump or related 
equipment 
13. Sudden and accidental tearing apart, 
cracking, burning or bulging of a steam or 
hot water f!eating system, an air conditioning 
or automatic fire protective sprinkie, 
system, or an appUance for heating water. 
This peril does not include loss caused by 
or resulting from freezing except as 
provided in the peril of freezing below. 
14. Freezing of a plumbing, heating, air 
conditioning or automatic fire protective 
sprfnkler system or of a household 
appliance. 
This peril does not Include loss on the 
Described Location INhile the dwelling Is 
unoccupied or being constructed, unless 
you have used reasonable care to: 
a. maintain heat In the buflding; or 
b. shut off the water supply and drain the 
system and appliances of water. 
15. Sudden and accidental damage from 
artificially generated electrical current. 
This peril does not include loss to a tube, 
transistor or similar electronic component. 
16. Volcanic Eruption other than loss caused 
by earthquake. land shock waves or 
tremors. 
GENERAL EXCLUSIONS 
1. We do not Insure for loss caused directly 
or lndfrectly by any of the foffowlng. Such 
loss Is excluded regardless of any other 
1 cause or event contributing concurrently or 
in any sequence .to the loss. 
a. Ordinance or Law, meaning enforce-
ment of any ordinance or law regulating 
the use. construction, repair, or 
demolition of a building or other 
structure, unless specifically provided 
under this policy. 
b. Earth Movement, meaning earthquake 
including land shock waves or tremors 
before, during or after a volcanic 
eruption; landslide: mine subsidence: 
mudflow; earth sinking, rising or shifting; 
unless direct loss by: 
(1) fire; 
(2} explosion; or 
(3) breakage of glass or safety glazing 
material which Is part of a building. 
storm door or storm window; 
ensues and then we will pay only for the 
ensuing loss. 
c. Water Damage, meaning: 
(1) flood, surface water, waves, tidal 
water, overflow of a body of water, 
or spray from any of these. whether 
or not driven by wind; 
(2) water which backs up through 
sewers or drains or which 
overflows from a sump; or 
(3) water below the surface of the 
ground, Including water which exerts 
pressure on or seeps or leaks 
through a building. sidewalk, 
driveway, foundation, s..yirnming _ 
poof or other structure. 
Direct loss by fire or explosion resulting 
from water damage is covered. 
· d. Power Failure, meaning the failure of 
power or. other utility service If the 
failure takes pli:ice off the Described 
Location. But, If a Peril Insured Against 
ensues on the Described Location, we 
will pay only for that ensuing loss. 
e. Neglect, meaning your neglect to use all 
reasonable means to save and preserve 
property at and after the time of a loss. 
f, War, Including undeclared war, civil war, 
insurrection, rebellion, revolution, 
warlike act by a military force or mlfitary 
personnel, destruction or seizure or use 
for a military purpose, and Including any 
consequence of any of these. Discharge 
of a nuclear weapon will be deemed a 
warlike act even If accidental. 
g. Nuclear Hazard, to the extent set forth 
In the Nuclear Hazard Clause of the 
Conditions. 
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h. · Intentional Loss, meaning any loss 
. arisi(lg ·dutof ~ny act c6m'mltted: 
(1) by or at the qirec;tlon of you or any 
.~i'§on or ofgarilziitlon named as an 
ai;fffj~lqnal insured: and 
(2) with the Intent to cause a loss. 
2. We do not insure for loss to property 
described fn Coverages A and B caused by 
any of the following. However\ any ensuing 
, loss to property described In Coverages A 
arid B not excluded or excepted in this 
policy Is covered. 
a. Weather conditions. However, this 
exclusion only applies if weather 
conditions contribute In any way with a 
cause or event excluded In paragraph 1. 
above to produce the loss; 
r--:-, 
.., 
b. Acts or decisions, including the failure 
to act or decide, of any person, group, 
organization or governmental body; 
C, f~·@:y, ·,n.adequ"°~te or d~fective; 
(1) planning, zoning, development, 
surveying. si~ing; (~J d~igq:··sp~cJfi~tlons, workmanship, 
_rfil:,jl_r. ~911?l'11¢Jlc;m, renovation, 
·.=eroooellng, i:iracllng, compaction; 
__ .., ... - .. - . 
(3) materials used in repair, construc-
tion, renovation or remodeling: or 
(4) maintenance; 
of part or all of any property whether 
on or off the Described Location. 
CONDITIONS 
1. Policy Period. This policy applies only to 
loss which occurs during the policy period. 
Z. Insurable Interest and Limit of Liability. 
Even If more th,m one person has an 
insurable interest In the property covered, 
we will not be liable In any one loss: 
a. for an amount greater than the Interest 
of a person insured under this policy; or 
b. for more than the applicable limit of 
liability 
., 
3. Concealment or Fraud. The entire policy 
will be void if. whether before or after a 
loss, you have: 
a. intentionally concealed or mlsrepre-
; sented any material fact or 
circumstance: 
b. engaged In fraudulent conduct; or 
c. made false statements; 
relating to this insurance. 
4. Your Duties Arter Loss. In case of a loss 
to covered property, you must see that the 
following are done 
a • give prompt notice to us or our agent: 
b. '. (1) protect the property from further 
damage: 
(2) make reasonable and necessary 
repairs to protect the property; and 
(3) keep an accurate record of repair 
expenses; 
c. prepare an inventory of damaged 
personal property showing the quantity, 
description, actual cash value and 
amount of loss. Attach all bllls, receipts 
and related documents that Justify the 
figures in the inventory; 
d. as often as we reasonably require: 
(1) show the damaged property; 
(2) provide us with records and 
documents we request and permit us 
to rnake copies; and 
(3) submit to examination under oath, 
while not in the presence of any 
other named Insured, and sign the 
same; 
e. send to us, within 60 days after our 
request, your signed, sworn proof of 
loss which sets forth, to the best of 
your knowledge and belief: 
(1) the time and cause of loss; 
(2) your Interest and that of all others in 
the property Involved and all liens on 
the property; 
(3) other insurance which may cover the 
loss: 
(4) changes In title or occupancy of the 
property during the term of the 
pollcy: 
(5) specifications of damaged buildings 
and detailed repair estimates; 
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